A: Interpretation - The negative must not contest the affirmative’s ethical standard, read an alternative framework, and or contest AFC, provided that the AC standard is act utilitarian, it’s disclosed on the NDCA wiki that the aff could read AFC with this specific standard, and the round is during the tournament of champions.

B: Violation - This shell is pre-emptive. My opponent violates if they contest or recontextualize the aff framework, read an NC, or contest AFC with a counter interp or theory argument that uses AFC as the violation.

C: Standards

1. Clash – AFC forces substantive engagement, especially with util frameworks that incentivize comparison of policies and accommodate a wide range of impacts. AFC additionally encourages rebuttal clash since arguments are on one level requiring comparison to be more meaningful. Disclosure and the Toc ensrues the neg can engage – you know I can read AFC and have had months to prep under util. Clash outweighs other links into education because we learn by making arguments and comparison, not by listening to debaters spread through cards. Clash is key to fairness because it insures reciprocal engagement on issues and prevents arguments from being ships passing in the night.

And topical clash outweighs philosophical clash a) Topical knowledge is portable because it allows debaters to simulate real world decisions and b) philosophy can be learned during other topics or contexts such as camp, whereas this is our last chance to engage on the topic.

1. Strategy skew – the aff speaks in the dark whereas the negative can adapt to the aff. The AC is on one level of the flow and the negative has access to alternate moral frameworks, procedurals, and discursive arguments that each function as independent outs to the ballot. AFC forces the neg to commit to the aff on substance and ensures arguments made in the AC matter. Strat skew controls the internal link to education because provides access to layers and prevents shifting out of clash. Preventing strat skew is key to fairness because debaters must be able to leverage offense to access the ballot.

D. Voter – Fairness is the voter because debate is a competitive activity based off skill and wins and losses.

Phil ed is good but framework debate harms it for multiple reasons:

1. Low quality arguments and misconceptions plague phil discussion. Nebel[[1]](#footnote-1) et Al 13

Some features of LD debate, as it is practiced today, encourage students to misrepresent philosophical arguments, ignore subtle distinctions, and oversimplify ideas. Here is one reason why. Debaters have limited speech time, so one reliable way to win is by overwhelming one’s opponent with objections. Instead of developing the best version of the best objection to each argument, debaters often make as many objections as they can think of, regardless of their quality. Why? Because a false argument is strategic so long as the explanation of its falsity is more time intensive than the argument itself. Students know that this strategy is successful, so they try to replicate it by learning how to generate large numbers of objections. Unfortunately, learning how to make more objections usually trades off with learning how to make better objections. (Perhaps it need not be this way, but that is the status quo.) So, many debaters, including the most successful ones, learn not to care about the quality of an argument. They internalize the view that any argument is worth making as long as it maximizes the debater’s time tradeoff—that is, the ratio of how long her opponent spends answering her objection compared to how long the objection took to develop. Sometimes, explaining an argument in the kind of depth and precision that philosophers use has little marginal value in terms of the debater’s time tradeoff. As long as she can get the basic argument out there, she can force her opponent to waste her time answering it. If the answers are poor, then all the better. If the answers are good, the debater will just dig in on a different argument, and it will not matter. Of course, some debates involve well developed arguments with thoughtful objections and an interesting dialectic that often mirrors current academic debates on the issue. But these are extremely rare because it is often easier and more efficient to oversimplify. Furthermore, the misunderstanding and oversimplification of some of the philosophical literature used in LD debate is a persistent problem. In our experience, the vast majority of students and instructors in LD debate use the word “utilitarianism” to describe any moral principle according to which the consequences of an act are relevant. This is a mistake because [but] there are many non-utilitarian version[s] of consequentialism, and because many non-consequentialists agree that consequences matter (they just aren’t all that matters). Is this too much nuance to expect from high school students? Maybe, but we think it would be better if debaters used no technical terms rather than incorrect ones. Misusing terms leads students to misinterpret what they read and, therefore, misunderstand the philosophy. Moreover, misusing terms may lead students to develop false beliefs about the philosophical terrain. Students who use “utilitarianism” incorrectly may end up believing that the only plausible view on which consequences matter is the theory that requires us to maximize total well-being. These students will believe in false dilemmas.

1. Debate teaches equivocation and structural issues such as speed prevent education. Nebel[[2]](#footnote-2) et Al 13

A more pernicious worry is that sometimes LD debaters will go as far as to intentionally misrepresent or distort arguments found in the philosophical literature. Debaters may read excerpts from various philosophers discussing the relationship between reason and moral responsibility while glossing over the subtleties of each thinker’s views, if not outright equivocating between fundamentally distinct uses of the relevant terminology. Members of the community are often complacent in regards to these practices. To see how widely our impressions held, we conducted a survey of 245 debaters, coaches, and judges. The respondents were readers of a debate blog—mostly current debaters, but nearly 80 coaches and 20 former debaters. 74 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the following statement: “Many arguments that succeed in LD are too poorly explained or read **too** fast to be adequately understood and answered” (see Figure 1). Similarly, 62 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that “debaters often misrepresent their evidence” (see Figure 2)

Finally, I don’t harm education to philosophy – debaters will still have to learn various types of philosophies to be successful to answering the contention levels of different frameworks. And if neg says fairness is not a voter affirm because he won’t care.

The value is morality and criterion **act utilitarianism.** Under the framework we act to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. A recontextualization of the framework would appeal to other ethical theories to weigh offense or argue for a different version of util.

### Advantage 1 is Bioterror

#### An attack is coming now --- terrorists are stockpiling biological agents

Bellamy 14 – international renowned BioWarfare expert who has published articles in the NER

(Bellamy, Jill. “Syria’s Silent Weapons.” *Global Research in International Affairs Center* 17 July 2014. <http://www.gloria-center.org/2014/07/syrias-silent-weapons/>)

In contrast to the fortress-like security of the SSRC itself, the viability of Syria’s pharmaceutical infrastructure and specifically veterinary vaccine and agricultural research facilities in Hama, Homs, Latakia, Cerin, Aleppo and Damascus, are of grave concern to analysts in light of recent looting. Given Al Qaeda’s ongoing efforts to acquire biological weapons capability, this theft cannot be seen as coincidental. Syria’s bio-pharmaceutical infrastructure and its dual-use equipment have experienced looting in areas where heavy fighting by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) forces has occurred. Since Al Qaeda has been vocal about its intent to acquire bioweapons capability, the recent arrest of the former head of Al Qaeda’s “WMD Directorate,” Yazid Sufaat[13] must be seen as an alarming development. Sufaat is tied to al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, both of whom were part of the team responsible for hijacking American Airlines Flight 77 and crashing it into the Pentagon.[14] Sufaat was Al Qaeda’s anthrax expert and established a number of labs in Afghanistan prior to the entry of the Northern Alliance. Although it is mildly disturbing to consider that Yazid Sufaat is again under ISA (Internal Security Act) detention, having previously been held for 7 years in Malaysia, and was charged in 2013 under section 130G (a) of the Penal Code for promoting terrorism in Syria, along with Muhammad Hilmi tHassim and his wife, Halimah Hussin.[15] Sufaat’s intended role in Syria may well have been an advisory one. Further alarm bells were rung when another Al Qaeda operative trained in microbiology, Samer al-Barq, was detained by Israeli security forces in 2010 when he attempted to enter Israel from Jordan. According to an article on the Global Security Newswire, “Al-Qaida’s interest in biological weapons is well documented and dates back to at least the late 1990s, according to Western issue experts. More recently, the international terrorist network’s Yemeni branch in the last year has been attempting to stockpile the lethal poison ricin for use in possible large-scale attacks in the United States, some intelligence sources have said.”[16] There are grounds for concern whenever high profile arrests and detentions are conducted with regard to terrorists highly educated in the life sciences, specifically in connection with Syria. The looting of Syria’s pharmaceutical laboratories (which would mainly have been Biological Safety Level (BSL) 1 or 2), estimated at around 70 percent, of which probably 20 to 30 percent are likely contributors to Asad’s bioweapons programs, should not be seen as a series of random incidents.[17] Looting a pharmaceutical firm or research facility means divesting it of bio-reactors, laminar flow hoods, centrifuges, incubators, refrigerators etc. and since the laboratories would possibly be involved in research on highly pathogenic agents, such as rabies, cholera, botulism, ricin, any looting would need to be orchestrated with care and precise timing. It’s not like walking off with a TV set from a city shop during a riot, when looting would be haphazard and looters would grab what they can on the go. There is a moderate probability that the looting of Syrian pharmaceutical facilities has been orchestrated by Al Qaeda, who may have retained highly-skilled, Western-educated biological and chemical experts for this purpose. Certainly, the reported looting of these facilities has occurred in sectors where Al Qaeda has been fighting.[18]

#### Terrorists will target airports --- SARS empirically proves

Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies for Transportation 06

(“Defending the U.S. Air Transportation System Against Chemical and Biological Threats.” *National Research Council* 1 December 2006. <http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11556&page=1>)//KW

Historically, most terrorist attacks on civilian targets have involved the use of firearms or explosives, and current defensive strategies are aimed at preventing attacks perpetrated by such means. However, the use of the nerve agent sarin in 1995 to attack the Tokyo subway system, the use of the U.S. mail in 2001 to distribute letters containing anthrax spores, and the discovery in 2004 of the biological toxin ricin in U.S. Senate Office Buildings in Washington, D.C., demonstrate that chemical and biological agents have been added to terrorists’ arsenals. Attacks involving chemical/biological agents are of great concern, not only because of the potential for mass casualties but also because there is no strategy or technology fielded today that can respond adequately to this threat. As the United States and other countries reassess the security measures they have in place to prevent or defend against such attacks (particularly in areas where large numbers of people gather and then widely disperse), the risks to the air transportation system as a primary target become clear. While potential attacks on all modes of transportation are of concern, the Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies for Transportation believes that the U.S. air transportation system continues to have a high priority for counterterrorism resources, both because of its economic importance and because of the intensified public perception of risk following the September 11, 2001, attacks. The air transportation system can also serve as a testbed for the development of defensive technologies and strategies that can subsequently be applied to other transportation modes. The large numbers of people gathered in air terminals—perpetually coming and going—provide anonymity to the terrorist, and the fact that most passengers carry luggage makes the detection of threat agents concealed in luggage more difficult. The rapid dispersal of passengers from air terminals to destinations around the world means that those who become infected with communicable diseases could spread the diseases widely in a short time, a situation that was demonstrated in 2003 in the case of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus. Finally, a chemical/biological attack on the U.S. air transportation system would raise the already high level of public anxiety about travel risks and would likely result in significant economic disruption.

#### Living wage solves airport security screener turnover and increases training --- empirics prove

Bernstein 04 – senior fellow @ Center on Budget and Policy, former chief economist to VP Biden

(Bernstein, Jared. “The Living Wage Movement: What is it, Why is it, and What's Known about its Impacts.” *National Bureau of Economic Research* December 2014. http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9951.pdf)//KW

A final important impact study is Reich, Hall and Jacobs's (2003) analysis of a particularly broad ordinance (in terms of coverage, wages, and other mandates, such as training standards) implemented at the San Francisco International Airport in 2000. While the authors find the expected increase in wages (they not that the wage of affected entry-level workers rose by an average of 33 percent), what's most notable about their findings are the efficiency wage effects. They report that turnover fell by an average of 34 percent among firms covered by the ordinance and that the decline in turnover rates increase with wages. To cite a particularly relevant occupation in our post-9/11 world, they report that turnover among airport security screeners, whose average wage rose by 55 percent after the living wage went into effect, fell from 94.7 percent per year to 18.7 percent fifteen months later. While Fairris (2003) finds a negative relation between living wages and training, Reich, Hall, and Jacobs report increased training as mandated by the ordinance itself. Finally, while they argue that employed levels were not affected by the ordinance, they do not offer the controls that would enable them to test this assertion relative to unaffected firms.

#### That’s the key internal link --- lack of airport screener experience devastates airport security --- SQUO can’t solve

GAO 2k – Government Accountability Office, independent agency which provides Congress with audit, evaluation, and investigative services

(“Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance.” *Government Accountability Office* June 2000. <http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156968.pdf>)//KW

Because the screening equipment at airport checkpoints does not automatically detect dangerous objects, the effectiveness of the screeners operating the equipment is vital to maintaining the security of the aviation system. It is the screeners who must determine whether an image on an X-ray screen or the triggering of a metal detector’s alarm indicates a security concern and, if so, what action should be taken to resolve the concern. FAA, the aviation industry, and others have long recognized that checkpoint screeners are not more successful in their detection of dangerous objects for several reasons. Two of the primary reasons are the rapid turnover among screeners and human factors issues. The rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-standing problem that affects performance. Turnover was cited as a concern in studies as early as 1979. The studies have found that the high turnover rate means that checkpoints are rarely staffed by screeners with much experience. For instance, one study found that about 90 percent of all screeners at any given checkpoint had less than 6 months’ experience.1 At one airport we visited, we found that, during a 3-month period in 1999, 114 of the 167 screeners (68 percent) hired had quit their jobs. Furthermore, of the 993 screeners trained at this airport over about a 1-year period, only 142 (14 percent) were still employed at the end of that year. Not only has turnover been an historical problem, but it is worse today than it was in the past. In 1987, we reported that turnover among screeners at some airports was about 100 percent in a 12-month period;2 by 1994, FAA was reporting that the turnover at some airports was 100 percent in a 10- month period.3 For the 12 months from May 1998 through April 1999, turnover averaged 126 percent among screeners at 19 large airports, according to data the airports reported to FAA. Five of the airports reported turnover of 200 percent or more, with one reporting turnover of 416 percent. Table 2 lists the turnover rates for screeners at 19 large airports during this period. Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the high turnover to the low wages screeners receive, the minimal benefits, and the daily stress of the job. Generally, screeners get paid at or near the minimum wage. We found that some of the screening companies at many of the nation’s largest airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6 an hour or less, and at some airports, the starting salary was the minimum wage—$5.15 an hour. It is common for the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be higher than the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport we visited, the screeners’ wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage at one of the airport’s fast-food restaurants was $7 an hour.

#### Airport security personnel devastates airport security – SQUO can’t solve

Frank 08 – American political analyst, historian, journalist and columnist

(Frank, Thomas. “TSA struggles to reduce persistent turnover.” *USA Today*. <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-02-24-tsa_N.htm>)

A similar scenario is unfolding in airports across the country, as the agency created after 9/11 to protect airplanes from terrorists struggles to keep screeners on the job. Airport security screeners have some of the worst job turnover of federal workers despite a $100-million effort to improve salaries and work duties, a USA TODAY analysis of federal data shows. One in five screeners left between Oct. 1, 2006, and Sept. 30, 2007, federal Office of Personnel Management figures show. The turnover rate was identical the year before. Attrition for the rest of the federal government was 8% in 2006-07. "Twenty percent (turnover) is pretty high," former Homeland Security Department inspector general Clark Ervin says. "You want people who are as sharp and experienced as possible, and that's why it's a concern." Screener departures leave airport checkpoints "chronically short-handed," says Rebecca O'Bryan, who last month left her full-time screener job at San Jose International Airport. "You've got these inexperienced people who are really slow using the equipment. It slows everything down." TSA spokeswoman Ellen Howe said the turnover is "manageable" and does not weaken security or slow the screening process because screeners get 180 hours of training when they are hired. "We have such a high training standard before they ever go on the line," she says. Turnover has impacted airport screening since before the TSA took over from private-sector security firms after Sept. 11. A congressional report in 2000 about screeners' failure to find weapons in covert tests said, "The rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-standing problem that affects performance." Although attrition now is lower than the 125% annual rate at major airports in the late 1990s, the problems today are similar to what they were years ago — tough work and low pay. About 73% of screeners who left last year quit their jobs; the other 27% retired, were fired, or moved on to another government job.

#### Bioterror coming now and causes extinction

Myhrvold 13 – PhD in Theoretical and Mathematical Physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as Chief Strategist and Chief Technology Officer of Microsoft Corporation

(Myhrvold, Nathan. July, “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action.” *The Lawfare Research Paper Series* No. 2 (2013). <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>)

A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV. It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included. The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed Atta attended a German university, where he earned a master’s degree in urban planning—not a field he likely chose for its relevance to terrorism. A future set of terrorists could just as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies innocently enough but later put their skills to homicidal use. Hundreds of universities in Europe and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the United States accept students from all over the world. Thus it seems likely that sometime in the near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will overcome our best defenses and do something truly terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that could kill millions or even billions of people.

### Plan

#### Thus the plan text:

#### Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage for employees working in airports.

Reich et al 03 – Professor of Economics at UC Berkeley and Research Chair of the Institute for Labor and Employment (ILE)

(Reich, Michael, Peter Hall, and Ken Jacobs. “Living Wages and Economic Performance the San Francisco Airport Model.” *Institute of Industrial Relations @ UC Berkeley* March 2003. <http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/research/livingwage/sfo_mar03.pdf>)

In recent years, changes in the organization of the airports and the airline industry, and the outsourcing of labor-intensive service jobs by government and private firms, created downward pressures on wages as firms competed to put in the lowest bids. Higher levels of government and regulatory agencies, such as the FAA, failed to reverse these forces, with a consequent decline in the level of services. In this context, city-level living wage policies create a common floor that enables employers to bid on service quality, not wages. Such policies should have positive effects on job performance and service quality.

I will defend normal means and all links and disads pertaining implementation of the plan.

### Underview 1

#### Living wage pushes families out of poverty, reducing poverty by 12.4 %. Adams and Neumark 04[[3]](#footnote-3)

The evidence on wage and employment effects sets the stage for weighing these competing effects, in particular examining the effect of living wage laws on poverty. To examine the impact of living wages on poverty, we estimate linear probability models for the full sample of families from March Annual Demographic Files of the CPS covering 1995 through 2001. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a family’s income falls below the federal government’s threshold for poverty, and zero otherwise. The specification includes city and year dummy variables, and differential trends for cities with and without living wage laws (or with different types of living wage laws). The evidence yields negative point estimates (implying poverty reductions) for both types of living wage laws, but only the estimated effect of business assistance living wage laws is statistically significant (at the ten-percent level). For business assistance living wage laws, the estimated coefficient of −0.024 in Table 2 implies that a one log unit increase in the living wage reduces the poverty rate by 2.4 percent. Relative to an 18.6 percent poverty rate, this represents a 12 percent reduction, or an elasticity of −0.12. This seems like a large effect, given a wage elasticity for low-wage workers below 0.1. Of course, no one is claiming that living wages can lift families from well below the poverty line to well above it. But living wages may help nudge families over the poverty line, and these average wage effects are likely manifested as much larger gains concentrated on a possibly quite small number of workers and families. Thus, even coupled with some employment reductions, living wages can lift a detectable number of families above the poverty line. We return to this point later, in the discussion of Brenner’s (2003) estimates of the number of workers that experienced wage increases as a result of Boston’s living wage law.

#### Poverty kills millions and is equivalent to an ongoing nuclear war on the poor.

Abu-Jamal 98(Mumia, award winning Pennsylvania journalist, quotes James Gilligan, Professor at Harvard/NYU, “A quiet and deadly violence”, <http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html>)

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. --GhandiIt has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

### Underview 2

1. Re-evaluate the debate under negs interps on both theory and T:

A) key to checking neg flex—bidirectional interps means you can always shift the debate to a preclusive layer. This skews 1AR time because I’m forced to win both theory and case debate and you can go for either in the 2N. Also justifies an RVI if you win theory is reject the debater because otherwise theory is a no-risk issue for my opponent.

B) key to reciprocity—I speak first so I must commit to a framing of the debate. I can’t read T against the neg so it’s a strategy that only the neg gets access too—making it game over allows neg to abuse that power.

C) maximizes topical education since reject debater ends the debate on theory and encourages 1ar to collapse to RVI. Rejecting arg ensures we can continue discussing the topic. Biggest impact to education since the topic is the only thing that changes from tournament to tournament. Also key to fairness because the topic is what we are both most ready and most expected to debate. Deciding the debate on non-substantive issues advantages the debater who has less prep on the topic and is technically stronger.

2 ( ) The neg must only advocate the converse. This requires reading either the minimum wage or some unconditional counterplan, 2 warrants: A) this burden structure is most reciprocal since we both have parallel burdens. Neither debater gets access to skepticism or permissibility, which is excellent because these strategies negate the value of the aff case value criterion down and force a restart in the 1AR, arbitrarily nullifying significant portions of my 6 minute speech. B) defending the converse forces topical debate rather than focusing on issues that have no relevance to living wage. Topical debate is key to fairness by ensuring ability to apply research and prep effectively and key to education by creating more meaningful clash.

2. Don’t vote on norm setting or potential abuse

A) Empirically denied as people read contradictory theory arguments all the time. Many people read RVI or no RVI depending on which side of the theory debate they're on. So double bind- either a) norms don't exist and are just a disingenuous tool used by debaters, or b) norms can exist but are too weak to be followed

B) No solvency - nobody is likely to care about one individual round, or even hear about it in the first place. There are thousands of rounds on any given topic, so at best the impact is mooted.

C) Every argument is potentially abusive in its extremes. And because it’s always to neg’s advantage to claim abuse, if the punishment for actual and potential abuse are the same, the purpose of theory to act as a check is destroyed

# Frontlines

## Framework

### Actor Specificity

#### 1. Resolution Context --- Ethical theories might be true in the abstract but practical considerations make different ethical systems applicable only to governments so my framework has a stronger link to the resolution, makes it more predictable and real world.

#### 2. Probability --- Even if his ethic is correct my theory has a higher probability of truth since it is empirically used by the government. Util is the only moral system available to policy-makers.

Goodin 95, Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University

(Robert E., Cambridge University Press, “Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy” pg 63)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, at relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the utilitarian calculus – if they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

### AT Intent/Foresight Distinction

#### No intention-foresight distinction - mental states like intention or motivation evaluate agents but have no bearing on action. Enoch[[4]](#footnote-4) summarizes Thomson

**Think about a hard medical decision** – say, **whether to give a suffering patient a deadly dose of morphine in order to relieve his pain**(at the price of his likely death). **And let’s assume that**in the circumstances**the**(medically, and also morally)**right thing to do is to give the morphine**. Now add the following piece of information: **The physician** making the decision and administering the procedure enjoys perverted pleasures from killing patients. If he gives the patient the morphine, he will do it intending to enjoy these perverted pleasures. He **foresees that the patient’s pain will be relieved [by a morphine dose], but this is not why he acts as he does.** Of course, now that we know these disturbing facts about the doctor and his relevant mental states, we will morally judge him accordingly, and will no doubt try to let someone else decide about the appropriate procedures. But – and this is the crucial point in our context – should this information make us change our mind regarding the permissibility of the relevant action? Could facts about these mental states of the doctor giving the morphine make us take back our judgments that this is the appropriate action in the circumstances, even when all other factors are held equal? The answer, it seems, is “no”. Thomson suggests that we learn from such examples that **the agent’s mental states are**simply**irrelevant for the moral permissibility of the relevant action. They are** very **relevant**, of course, **for the evaluation of the agent, but this is an entirely different story**. And **because mental states are irrelevant for the moral status of the action, the intending-foreseeing distinction, understood as a distinction between two mental states, and applied to the moral evaluation of actions, is without moral weight**22. Of course, as it stands this line of thought is too quick. Strictly speaking, what the example at most shows is that sometimes the agent's mental states are irrelevant to the permissibility of the relevant action, not that they never are. But the strength of the intuitive judgment Thomson uses, together with the distinction between the evaluation of the action and that of the agent, and given the absence of an obvious rationale for why it is that the mental states should be relevant to permissibility in some circumstances but not others – all these factors together strongly suggest, I think, the more general conclusion.

### A Priori Knowledge Is Based on A Posteriori

#### Even if a priori knowledge is possible, they are based on a posteriori knowledge

Lacewing – director of research @ Heythrop College, PhD in philosophy

(Lacewing, Michael. “Hume on Knowledge.” *Routledge Taylor & Francis Group* no date. <http://documents.routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A2/Hume/HumeKnowledge.pdf>)

all a priori knowledge (relations of ideas) is analytic, while all knowledge of synthetic propositions (matters of fact) is a posteriori. In other words, anything we know that is not true by definition or logic alone, every ‘matter of fact’, we must learn and test through our senses. MATTERS OF FACT Causal inference We can say that, according to Hume, knowledge of matters of fact is always a posteriori and synthetic. We gain it by using observation and employing induction and reasoning about probability. The foundation of this knowledge is what we experience here and now, or can remember. Matters of fact beyond this are established by ‘probable’ arguments, not deductive proofs. Hume sets out ‘to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of the senses, or the records of our memory’ (p. 108). His answer is that such knowledge rests on causal inference. If I receive a letter from a friend with a French postmark on it, I’ll believe that my friend is in France – because I infer from the postmark to a place. I do this because I think where something is posted causes it to have the postmark of that place; and if the letter was posted by my friend, then I believe that he must be in France.

## Bioterror

### AT Terrorists can’t access

#### Terrorists can obtain Bio-weapons and will use them – Syria Demise

Blair ‘12

(Charles P. Blair joined FAS in June 2010. He is the Senior Fellow on State and Non-State Threats. Born and raised in Los Alamos, New Mexico, Mr. Blair was an exchange student in Moscow in the mid-1980s, witnessing firsthand the closing salvos of the Cold War. Since the end of that era, Mr. Blair has worked on issues relating to the diffusion and diversification of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the context of proliferation amid the rise of mass casualty terrorism incidents and the centripetal and centrifugal elements of globalization. Mr. Blair’s work focuses on state and violent non-state actors (VNSA) – amid a dystopic and increasingly tribal world. “Fearful of a nuclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria” 1 MARCH 2012 accessed online August 22, 2012 at http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/fearful-of-nuclear-iran-the-real-wmd-nightmare-syria)

As possible military action against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program looms large in the public arena, far more international concern should be directed toward Syria and its weapons of mass destruction. When the Syrian uprising began more than a year ago, few predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter toward collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appears inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see similarities with Libya's civil war, during which persistent fears revolved around terrorist seizure of Libyan chemical weapons, or the Qaddafi regime's use of them against insurgents. Those fears turned out to be unfounded.¶ But the Libyan chemical stockpile consisted of several tons of aging mustard gas leaking from a half-dozen canisters that would have been impossible to utilize as weapons. Syria likely has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapon programs in the world. Moreover, Syria may also possess an offensive biological weapons capability that Libya did not.¶ While it is uncertain whether the Syrian regime would consider using WMD against its domestic opponents, Syrian insurgents, unlike many of their Libyan counterparts, are increasingly sectarian and radicalized; indeed, many observers fear the uprising is being "hijacked" by jihadists. Terrorist groups active in the Syrian uprising have already demonstrated little compunction about the acquisition and use of WMD. In short, should Syria devolve into full-blown civil-war, the security of its WMD should be of profound concern, as sectarian insurgents and Islamist terrorist groups may stand poised to seize chemical and perhaps even biological weapons.¶ An enormous unconventional arsenal. Syria's chemical weapons stockpile is thought to be massive. One of only eight nations that is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention -- an arms control agreement that outlaws the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons -- Syria has a chemical arsenal that includes several hundred tons of blistering agents along with likely large stockpiles of deadly nerve agents, including VX, the most toxic of all chemical weapons. At least four large chemical weapon production facilities exist. Additionally, Syria likely stores its deadly chemical weapons at dozens of facilities throughout the fractious country. In contrast to Libya's unusable chemical stockpile, analysts emphasize that Syrian chemical agents are weaponized and deliverable. Insurgents and terrorists with past or present connections to the military might feasibly be able to effectively disseminate chemical agents over large populations. (The Global Security Newswire recently asserted that "[t]he Assad regime is thought to possess between 100 and 200 Scud missiles carrying warheads loaded with sarin nerve agent. The government is also believed to have several hundred tons of sarin agent and mustard gas stockpiled that could be used in air-dropped bombs and artillery shells, according to information compiled by the James Martin Center.")¶ Given its robust chemical weapons arsenal and its perceived need to deter Israel, Syria has long been suspected of having an active biological weapons program. Despite signing the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention in 1972 (the treaty prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons), Syria never ratified the treaty. Some experts contend that any Syrian biological weapons program has not moved beyond the research and development phase. Still, Syria's biotechnical infrastructure undoubtedly has the capability to develop numerous biological weapon agents. After Israel destroyed a clandestine Syrian nuclear reactor in September 2007, Damascus may have accelerated its chemical and biological weapons programs.¶ It's hard to guard WMD when a government collapses. Although the United States and its allies are reportedly monitoring Syria's chemical weapons, recent history warns that securing them from theft or transfer is an extraordinary challenge. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, more than 330 metric tons of military-grade high explosives vanished from Iraq's Al-Qaqaa military installation. Almost 200 tons of the most powerful of Iraq's high-explosives, HMX -- used by some states to detonate nuclear weapons -- was under International Atomic Energy Agency seal. Many tons of Al-Qaqaa's sealed HMX reportedly went missing in the early days of the war in Iraq. Forensic tests later revealed that some of these military-grade explosives were subsequently employed against US and coalition forces.¶ Even with a nationwide presence of 200,000 coalition troops, several other sensitive military sites were also looted, including Iraq's main nuclear complex, Tuwaitha. Should centralized authority crumble in Syria, it seems highly unlikely that the country's 50 chemical storage and manufacturing facilities -- and, possibly, biological weapon repositories -- can be secured. The US Defense Department recently estimated that it would take more than 75,000 US military personnel to guard Syria's chemical weapons. This is, of course, if they could arrive before any WMD were transferred or looted -- a highly unlikely prospect.¶ Complicating any efforts to secure Syria's WMD, post-Assad, are its porous borders. With Syria's government distracted by internal revolt and US forces now fully out of Iraq, it is plausible that stolen chemical or biological weapons could find their way across the Syrian border into Iraq. Similarly, Syrian WMD could be smuggled into southern Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, Israel, and, potentially, the United States and Europe.¶ At least six formal terrorist organizations have long maintained personnel within Syria. Three of these groups -- Hamas, Hizbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad -- have already attempted to acquire or use chemical or biological agents, or both. Perhaps more troubling, Al Qaeda-affiliated fighters from Iraq have streamed into Syria, acting, in part, on orders from Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. In the past, Al Qaeda-in-Iraq fighters attempted to use chemical weapons, most notably attacks that sought to release large clouds of chlorine gas. The entry of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups into the Syrian crisis underscores its increasingly sectarian manifestation. Nearly 40 percent of Syria's population consists of members of minority communities. Syria's ruling Alawite regime, a branch of Shia Islam, is considered heretical by many of Syria's majority Sunni Muslims -- even those who are not jihadists. Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians could all become targets for WMD-armed Sunni jihadists. Similarly, Shiite radicals could conceivably employ WMD agents against Syria's Sunnis.¶ Religious fanaticism and WMD. Evidence of growing religious fanaticism is also reflected in recent Syrian suicide attacks. Since last December, at least five suicide attacks occurred in Syria. In the 40 years preceding, only two suicide attacks were recorded. Al Qaeda-linked mujahidin are believed to be responsible for all of these recent attacks. Civil wars are often the most violent and unpredictable manifestations of war. With expanding sectarian divisions, the use of seized WMD in Syria's uprising is plausible. To the extent that religious extremists believe that they are doing God's bidding, fundamentally any action they undertake is justified, no matter how abhorrent, since the "divine" ends are believed to legitimize PDF the means.¶ The situation in Syria is unprecedented. Never before has a WMD-armed country fallen into civil war. All states in the region stand poised to lose if these weapons find their way outside of Syria. The best possible outcome, in terms of controlling Syria's enormous WMD arsenal, would be for Assad to maintain power, but such an outcome seems increasingly implausible. And there is painfully little evidence that democratic forces are likely to take over in Syria. Even if they do eventually triumph, it will take months or years to consolidate control over the entire country.¶ If chaos ensues in Syria, the United States cannot go it alone in securing hundreds of tons of Syrian WMD. Regional leaders -- including some, such as Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran, that are now backing the insurgency and the regime, respectively -- must come together and begin planning to avert a dispersion of Syrian chemical or biological weapons that would threaten everyone, of any political or religious persuasion, in the Middle East and around the world.

### AT Too many barriers

#### Bioterrorism coming now—no impediments to deployment

**Glassman, 12** (James, “We're Letting Our Bioterrorism Defenses Down,” April 4th, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesglassman/2012/04/04/were-letting-our-bioterrorism-defenses-down/print/)

A little over three years ago, a commission of experts, established by Congress, concluded that the chances were better than 50-50 that a weapon of mass destruction would be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 2013. And, said the [Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism](http://www.absa.org/leg/WorldAtRisk.pdf), that weapon is more likely to be biological than nuclear.¶ Both Michael Chertoff, former secretary of Homeland Security, and Admiral Mike McConnell, former director of national intelligence, have said that bioterror – not a nuclear weapon – was their greatest fear when they were in office. “[In terms of catastrophic attacks, bio was at the top of the list](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterrorism.html?_r=1),” said Chertoff, who served from 2005 to 2009¶ Bacillus anthracis, via Wikipedia¶ But we haven’t heard much about bioterrorism since the anthrax incidents that closely followed 9/11, a little over a decade ago. The truth is that America remains vulnerable to an attack that could kill hundreds of thousands. Terrorists could spray Bacillus anthracis from crop-dusters over football stadiums. Or they could send intentionally infected fanatics out to spread the smallpox virus through a crowded city, doing far more damage than a brigade of suicide bombers.¶ While biological warfare dates back centuries (cadavers were used to contaminate the water supplies of enemies), the United States was paying scant attention to bio-defense until a few years before the airplane attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Despite a relatively swift mobilization after 9/11, severe problems remain.¶ A “[Bio-Response Report Card” study](http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf), issued last October by the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, concluded, “The nation does not yet have adequate bio-response capability to meet fundamental expectations during a large-scale biological event.” The study gives grades of “D” to “detection and diagnosis” and “medical counter-measure availability” for a major bioterror attack.¶ Biological weapons have been called the “poor man’s atom bomb.” They are nowhere near as difficult to manufacture as nuclear weapons, and their return address is hard to assess, making them ideal for non-state actors like Al Qaeda, which, in fact, has been [seeking to acquire](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf) biological WMD since at least 1999.¶ A report 12 years ago concluded, “Individuals, with no background in the development and production of bioweapons and no access to the classified information from the former U.S. bio-weapons program, were able to produce a significant quantity of high-quality weaponized Bacillus globigii – a close cousin to the well-known threat, Anthrax.”¶ Colonies of Baccilus subtilis, via Wikipedia¶ In the spring of 2001, a Defense Science Board report, co-authored by Nobel Prize winner Joshua Lederberg and George Whiteside, former chair of the Harvard chemistry department, concluded that “major impediments to the development of biological weapons…have largely been eliminated in the last decade by the rapid spread of biotechnology.¶ Later that year, five Americans were killed by anthrax powder, carried in letters. The FBI is convinced that the letters came from a civilian employee of the U.S. Army. If so, then “a single employee with no work experience in the weaponization of pathogens,… using equipment that could be readily purchased over the Internet, was able to produce very high-quality, dry-powdered anthrax,” said the [Bio-Response Report Card](http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf).

### AT No risk

#### Not true- they have no specific evidence to an attack on airports- cross apply CASTT 6- that says airports are the perfect place for a terrorist attack- means if we win terrorists have the motive- then there’s a risk of the impact

### AT Won’t spread

#### Not true- viruses will eventually spread and mutate- also a risk is higher because an attack on an airport means the disease is carried globally- there’s a faster timeframe for the impact

Alexander 7 (Timothy, Former Scottish Editor of Burke’s Peerage, B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies, October 22nd, “War On Iran = You Die from Biowar”, Op Ed News, http://www.opednews.com/articles/genera\_lord\_sti\_071020\_war\_on\_iran\_\_3d\_you\_di.htm)

We have been conditioned, by seeing films of mushroom clouds and images of nuclear destruction in Japan at the end of WWII, to have some understanding of the horrific effects of a nuclear war. We have NOT been conditioned to understand the effects of Twenty-first Century advanced biological war. The kill numbers are very similar, just with biowar you don't get the "big bangs", the mushroom clouds, the nuclear bombers, the ICBMs, etc. Just sub-microscopic genetically engineered super killer viruses that we have absolutely no defense against, delivered in secret, with a slow horrifying unstoppable migration through the global human population. All the fear of a naturally mutated form of "bird flu" that might kill tens of millions is simply "child's play" compared to multiple designer military viruses that are built to kill in the many hundreds of millions to billions of people globally. It costs approximately US$1 million to kill one person with nuclear weapons-of-mass destruction but only approximately US$1 to kill one person with biological weapons-of-mass destruction. Bioweapons are truly the "poor man's nukes". The Iranians are known to have a biological weapons program and they, and their allies, certainly have the means to deliver biowar agents into the Israeli and European and North American homelands. Bioweapons do not have to be dispersed via missiles or bombs, they are perfect for non-traditional normally non-military delivery systems. Being very small (there are, for example, typically approximately 40 million bacterial cells in every gram of soil and massively more viruses in the same gram), they lend themselves to an enormous variety of non-detectable methodologies for delivery and use in war, both regionally and globally. What is being missed here, with all the talk of Iran developing nuclear weapons or not (depending on one's viewpoint), is that Iran is already a state that possesses WMD. HELLO, ANY WAR WITH IRAN IS HIGHLY APT TO INVOLVE LARGE SCALE DEATHS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN WMD THREAT. Hello again, this means that YOU...the person reading this...is apt to die from biowar in event of a war with Iran! We are in a MAD....mutually assured destruction....pre-war state with Iran, just as we are with Russia and and to a lessor extent with China when it comes to nuclear weapons. A famous line from the movie "Wargames" (referring to engaging in nuclear war and the odds of "winning" such a war) is "the only winning move is not to play". Sad to say, this does not seem to have any bearing on the apocalyptic strategy of the neocon push for war with Iran. The nature of biowar is that it is a "gift that keeps on giving". Once released, advanced recombination DNA based viral bioweapons will continue to spread and kill and kill

#### And an attack sweeps the planet- psychological, economic impact and ease of spread

Lilliefors ‘12

(James Lilliefors is a longtime journalist and writer, Lilliefors has written frequently for the Washington Post, the Miami Herald, The Boston Globe and the Baltimore Sun. He started his journalism career as a writer and editor for Runner's World magazine and worked for many years as a newspaper editor and reporter, in Maryland and in Florida, winning a number of reporting awards. He also has extensively explored the issue of biological weapons research in his novel Viral. “Bio-weapons 40 years later: Are we any safer?” APRIL 10, 2012 accessed online August 25, 2012 at http://www.sohopress.com/bio-weapons-40-years-later-are-we-any-safer/442/)

As many as a dozen other nations have pursued or developed offensive biological weapons programs since the treaty came into effect, U.S. officials believe, including North Korea, China, Iran and Syria. But perhaps more troubling is the fact that it has become easier for potential terrorists to obtain biological weapons. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference in Geneva last December (the seventh such international conference since the treaty was signed): “Unfortunately, the ability of terrorists and other non-state actors to develop these weapons is growing.” So, too, apparently, is their desire to do so. In 2010, for instance, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula called for “brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.” The world community remains focused on potential nuclear threats—from Iran to North Korea to Pakistan—even though a biological attack could be just as devastating, and more unpredictable. This was the message that Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security, took to the 2009 annual meeting of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. Tauscher warned that “… a major biological weapons attack on one of the world’s major cities could cause as much death and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear attack.” Her comments came in conjunction with President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which set a platform for identifying and responding to possible bio-attacks. This new national strategy was clearly a step in the right direction, updating some of the objectives and principles of the 1972 treaty (which now has 165 signatories). But a more robust international dialogue on improving global health security—something akin to the nuclear threat dialogue—is still sorely needed. To understand how insidiously disruptive even a small-scale biological event could be, we need only look at the anthrax attacks of September and October 2001. Several letters containing anthrax spores were mailed anonymously to news organizations and two United States senators. Five people died as a result, 17 others were infected. Congress was paralyzed and the country was on high alert for weeks—although the heightened concern was mostly transitory. The federal investigation into the attacks went on for more than eight years without an arrest. The case was finally closed in 2010, a year and a half after the FBI’s major suspect, a government bio-defense researcher named Brice Ivins, killed himself.¶ The potential for an “anonymous” event is one of the most frightening aspects of the increasingly complex biological threat. As new diseases emerge, as the life sciences grow more sophisticated and as globalization draws everyone closer together, there are simply more ways that a deadly virus could get loose than there were even a few years ago. It is possible that a deadly pathogen could sweep the planet and we would never know for certain if it was naturally occurring, accidental, a terror attack or something deliberately let loose by a deranged scientist—which is what the FBI believes happened with the anthrax attacks of 2001. As President Obama said recently, “We must come together to prevent and detect and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it’s a pandemic like H1N1 or a terrorist threat or a terrible disease.”

### Motive

#### Bioterror is inevitable – they have the means and motive

**Center for Nonproliferation Studies 11** [Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment PREPARED FOR THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION BY: Gary A. Ackerman and Kevin S. Moran Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies March 2011]

Regarding the capability of terrorists to engage in mass-casualty biological attack 10 , several authors contend that previous technical obstacles to obtaining or developing biological weapons have eroded, and that a biological weapons capability is most likely within the reach of at least a certain subset of terrorist groups. The group most commonly cited as being likely to “overcome the technical, organizational and logistical obstacles to WMD” 11 is the al-Qa`ida network, which is reported to be pursuing several types of WMD, including biological weapons. Other commentators are more sanguine about current terrorist capabilities, believing that they have been exaggerated and that technical hurdles still prevent terrorists from engaging in anything more than small to medium-sized attacks using biological weapons (which would not constitute true WMD events). For example, at the more conservative end of the spectrum, a renowned expert like Donald Henderson believes that it is unlikely that more than a few terrorist groups would be able to succeed in procuring any of the agents of highest concern in a form that could be dispensed by aerosol in a manner that would result in mass casualties. 12 Yet even the most conservative of these authors do not unequivocally dismiss the prospect of a group currently (or in the near future) being able to field a biological weapon. Indeed, the only discernible area of agreement between analysts seems to be that there exists at least a minimal possibility of a technologically and organizationally adept terrorist organization succeeding in acquiring a biological weapon capable of causing mass casualties. One remarkable feature within the broader discussion about terrorist capabilities for bioterrorism is that hardly any of those who believe terrorists currently lack this capacity mention anything about future developments. If recent trends in terrorism have taught us anything, it is that terrorists are nimble, highly adaptive actors who can be innovative when necessary. Terrorist capabilities in general display an upward trend and one must bear in mind that even though a terrorist group’s ideology may seem in the eyes of their opponents to be archaic and obscurantist, this does not mean that the group lacks a solid grasp of the most modern technology. At the same time, general advances in several areas of biotechnology and the rapid commercialization and diffusion of this technology mean that equipment and techniques that once resided within the sole purview of a state’s military apparatus (such as the ability to synthesize complex chemicals or identify single nucleotide polymorphisms) can now be found in off-the-shelf commercial applications. One of the negative externalities of this technological dynamism is the opportunities it can provide for malefactors. Consequently, even if terrorist groups may lack the capability to engage in bioterrorist attacks today, it is necessary to consider the prospects 8for them gaining this capability in the future, with special attention paid to both the direction and pace of change. We have thus highlighted an examination of the rate of change of terrorist capabilities for bioterrorism (i.e., are terrorists likely to acquire these capabilities within five years? Or fifteen? Or fifty?) as an urgent research need.

### Timeframe

#### Highly likely – terrorist pursuit, lack of preparation and insecure bio-labs

Lambrecht 9 Bill, Post-Dispatch Washington Bureau Chief, 9-11, Talent keeps focus on terror, http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/politics/story/65FEB96462BF4CEC8625762D007F8D95?OpenDocument

This week, Talent was back in front of the cameras in Washington as part of a new effort to hasten preparations for what Talent's commission believes is the probability of another terrorist attack. Last December, amid little fanfare, Talent's panel reached a frightening conclusion: "The commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." The weapon most likely to be used? A biological agent such as a virus, bacteria or disease-casusing toxin, the commission concluded. Spelling out the threat at a news conference this week, Talent described the horrific scenario of a pickup truck blowing anthrax around the perimeter of Fourth of July celebrations in St. Louis. "You're talking about killing a minimum of tens of thousands of people," he said. READINESS STRESSED National security has often become a partisan issue in recent years, but Talent says politics play no role in the mission of his panel: identifying threats and recommending ways to avoid them. Since early 2008, he has worked closely with the commission's chairman, former Sen. Bob Graham, a Florida Democrat. Last week, Talent stood alongside Sen. Joseph Lieberman, an Independent from Connecticut, to promote Lieberman's legislation, which aims to prepare for a biological attack. In an interview, Talent explained why he believes that a biological attack is possible, if not probable. Terrorism is all but certain to continue, Talent said, pointing to intelligence obtained after 9/11 showing that al-Qaida is seeking destructive weapons. "If you are ruthless enough, this is what you will gravitate to," he said. "It is perfectly logical that they will be trying to get this kind of weaponry." Talent said his intention is not to frighten people, although his commission surely does so with its sobering possibilities. "There are hundreds of thousands of people around the world trying to stop this," he said. Talent argues for a much more focused effort by the government to get ready for an attack. After the new administration took power, he and Graham pushed to have Vice President Joe Biden put in charge of White House preparation. Graham said this week that they had received "no definite response to the request." There is much to be done. For instance, the Government Accountability Office — the investigative arm of Congress — produced the eye-opening conclusion a year ago that two of the five American labs containing the world's most dangerous biological agents and disease pathogens had a "significant lack" of security.

### Bostrom

#### Under a state of moral uncertainty, default to preventing existential risks

Bostrom 11 – Swedish philosopher @ St. Cross College, Oxford known for his work on existential risks

Bostrom, Nick. “The Concept of Existential Risk,” Future of Humanity Institute (2011), Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy. <http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html>.

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. We thus want to reach a state in which we have (a) far greater intelligence, knowledge, and sounder judgment than we currently do; (b) far greater ability to solve global-coordination problems; (c) far greater technological capabilities and physical resources; and such that (d) our values and preferences are not corrupted in the process of getting there (but rather, if possible, improved). Factors b and c expand the option set available to humanity. Factor a increases humanity's ability to predict the outcomes of the available options and understand what each outcome would entail in terms of the realization of human values. Factord, finally, makes humanity more likely to want to realize human values. How we, from our current situation, might best achieve these ends is not obvious (figure 5). While we ultimately need more technology, insight, and coordination, it is not clear that the shortest path to the goal is the best one

## Ks

### Securitization

1. Double-bind—either securitization links are linear or threshold. If linear, the plan’s effect is marginal to none—we’re literally just raising the wages for a few employees. If threshold, then Uniqueness overwhelms the link because many other things like government policy, the prison industrial complex, a ruse of democracy, or states of emergency control larger alternate links into the impact
2. Non-Unique—the plan doesn’t establish any new policies, just makes them more effective. The screening policies are still in neg’s world, just ineffective

### Terror Talk

1. No impact—the probability of terrorism is garnered through link and impact cards, not

# Theory

## AT Cannot Spec to Specific Industry

#### Counterinterp: The aff solvency advocate must be a professor in a relevant field. Living wages are contextually dependent on the industry being discussed.

Mullin 12 – Professor in the Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning Department at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Associate Director of the Center for Economic Development, and former Dean of the Graduate School

(Mullin, John, Zenia Kotval, Zeenat Kotval-K, and Patricia Machemer. “A living wage standard: A case study of the US Virgin Islands.” *Local Economy* August/September 2012 27: 541-557, doi:10.1177/0269094212449581)

Pollin et al. (2008) identify another distinction between a minimum wage and a living wage in that a minimum wage affects the vast majority of the low-wage workforce, while living wages have a much narrower coverage. Typically, a living wage ordinance is a local law that establishes a wage floor for a specific group of workers. By far the most common ordinance only applies to businesses holding service contracts with government. To a lesser degree, the ordinance extends to employers that receive subsidies or tax abatements from government.

#### End quote. This means that affirmatives must be specific to particular industries if they want to be topical.

#### I meet—my aff is specific to the airport industry and my solvency advocate is an economics professor at UC Berkeley. I will give offensive reasons to prefer the counterinterp on the original shell. Go there now:

### Parallel Turns

1. Depth --- defending a specific industry allows us to learn in-depth about that industry instead of debating living wages in general, promoting depth. Also, because not all affs will be specific to the airport industry, over time my counterinterp captures breadth of education as well. In round discussions that happen in depth are key to education because it allows debaters to focus and thoroughly examine a limited number of issues. This outweighs breadth because it gives our education more meaning and fosters critical thinking. Also key to fairness because it allows the debaters to make specific impact and link comparison arguments, thereby allowing the debater who is better at argumentation as opposed to tricks to win.

#### The most qualified studies prove that depth outweighs breadth – it’s the only real world impact

Science Daily 09 (Science Daily, “Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, In High School Science Courses”, <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090305131814.htm>)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each.¶ Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report.¶ The study relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes.¶ "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States."¶ The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time.¶ The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.¶ The study explored differences between science disciplines, teacher decisions about classroom activities, and out-of-class projects and homework. The researchers carefully controlled for differences in student backgrounds.¶ The study also points out that standardized testing, which seeks to measure overall knowledge in an entire discipline, may not capture a student's high level of mastery in a few key science topics. Teachers who "teach to the test" may not be optimizing their students' chance of success in college science courses, Tai noted.¶ "President Obama has challenged the nation to become the most educated in the world by having the largest proportion of college graduates among its citizens in the coming decade," Tai said. "To meet this challenge, it is imperative that we use the research to inform our educational practice."¶ The study was part of the Factors Influencing College Science Success study, funded by the National Science Foundation.¶

#### Quality of Ground --- Increases in wages affect various industries differently --- unemployment proves

Lanzona 14 – professor of economics @ Ateneo de Manila University

(Lanzona, Leonardo A. “Effects of minimum wage on the Philippine economy.” *Policy Notes* Aug. 2014. <http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/webportal/CDN/PUBLICATIONS/pidspn1415.pdf>)

Minimum wages, more than other forms of regulation, are more directly associated with unemployment. Maloney and Mendez (2004) pointed out that minimum wages could impose a restriction on the amount of benefits offered by firms. Workers carry part of the burden of higher minimum wages in the form of lower benefits (though somewhat mitigated by mandatory benefit restrictions) and reduced worker security. Both of these effects may result in greater incidence of unemployment or lower participation in the formal sector. If ever such distortions exist, employment and output will be reduced. Nevertheless, it should also be stated that these distortions affect industries and workers differently. Large, highly capitalized firms are more able to absorb these distortions or costs and may be largely unaffected by the policies. Small firms can face greater costs, and are more adversely affected by these policies.

End quote. This means that weighing and link ground differs significantly depending on the industry in question. Talking about poverty or unemployment from a generic whole-res perspective is nonsensical on this topic because the effects of living wages on unemployment and poverty change depending on the industry in question. This allows both the aff and neg to generate more specific links to the topic. Quality ground key to fairness because it is the mechanism by which we construct good arguments to affirm or negate the topic.

Also fosters more real world discussion on the topic, because talking about living wages and poverty from a whole-res perspective oversimplifies the issue at hand. Real world education is valuable because it’s the only portable knowledge we will take with us post-high school.

1. Topic lit --- Bernstein 04

Bernstein, Jared. "The Living Wage Movement. What Is It, Why Is It, and What’s Known about Its Impact?." Emerging labor market institutions for the twenty-first century. University of Chicago Press, 2004. 99-140.

Although living wage movements have appeared throughout this century (Glickman 1997) the contemporary movement is centered on a specific policy: passing a local ordinance to raise the wage floor for a specified group of workers covered by the ordinance.¶ Since the mid-1990s, such ordinances have proliferated. According to a recent review by Brenner (2003b), more than 100 cities, counties, or other entities had enacted living wage laws by the end of 2002. The community- organizing group Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), prominent living wage advocates, reports that as of mid- 2003 there are seventy-two ongoing living wage campaigns. University students have also mobilized recently on behalf of low-wage workers, calling for ordinances to raise the pay of support staff.

End quote. Prefer Bernstein because A) that’s the definition that he presents after looking at the 100 cities that already have the living wage; B) He cites multiple authors about recent living wage laws who define the living wage as being group specific, in conjunction to being consistent with the Mullin evidence from the interp AND C) he analyzes the historical evolution of the concept of living wages, so he is most temporally sensitive to the question of what living wages entail.

Topic lit key to questions of what words mean in the resolution, since it is the basis by which we research the resolution. Also key to predictability, since it’s the only mutually agreed upon basis for pre-round prep.

### AT Predictability

\*SIMILAR TO ARGUMENTS ON AT RESEARCH BURDENS/INFININTE CASELIST. CROSS-APPLY ONES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE.

1. My interp solves by mandating that the solvency advocate has to be a professor in the relevant field. That limits the amount of affs possible down to around 10.
2. Predictability isn’t verifiable. I don’t know what you prepared before the round because I don’t have the right to look through your expando or laptop. Verifiability is a side constraint to voting on theory because you need to know that the abuse occurred before voting for it.
3. Link mitigation: there are a limited number of industries, and fewer that a living wage would affect since only industries with lots of low-wage workers would be affected
4. TURN: predictability kills critical thinking. If a position is predictable, people will simply rely on frontlines and blocks instead of thinking on their feet. I control uniqueness --- people rely on coaches and prep-outs in the status quo. That’s key to education because it’s a skill we will carry out of debate. Outweighs predictability on a) magnitude --- we will use critical thinking for the rest of our lives but your predictability was only hurt this round and b) probability --- cross-apply the verifiability argument here. Your predictability impacts aren’t probable but critical thinking is.

### AT Field Context

1. TURN: my counter-interp is better for field context <PICK AND CHOOSE THE FOLLOWING>:
   1. My author is qualified. Mullin is a professor in regional planning, which means he has to know the structure of a city and how policies would affect it, including living wage. Further, he is the associate director of the Center for Economic Development, making him qualified to talk about economic issues such as the living wage, while <DO COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS>
   2. My evidence is more recent, allowing it to take into account of changes to living wages over time and after the evidence on the interp
2. No warrant: my evidence in the AC indicates that my AC is within the field context.
3. No internal link: no reason your author should be the end-all-be-all for determining field context. This is especially true on this topic when there are conflicting definitions in the literature about living wage.

### AT Research Burdens/Infinite Caselist

\*SIMILAR TO ARGUMENTS ON AT PREDICTABILITY. CROSS-APPLY ONES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE.

1. My interp solves by mandating that the solvency advocate has to be a professor in the relevant field. That limits the amount of affs possible down to around 10.
2. Link mitigation: there are a limited number of industries, and fewer that a living wage would affect since only industries with lots of low-wage workers would be affected
3. TURN: increased research burden leads to more and better research. It forces you to look harder to find solvency advocates and articles against them. Key to education because it’s a skill we will carry out of debate. Outweighs research burden because a) magnitude --- we continue to use these research skills for the rest of our lives but your research burden was only hurt this round and b) research burdens is arbitrary. There’s no briteline for when you need to do too much research.
4. Framework debate solves research burden. You can simply beat back framework to avoid the case and research burden.

### AT Quantity of Ground

1. No warrant: you still get access to your DAs <OR WHATEVER GROUND THEY CLAIM YOU TAKE AWAY>. You simply need to make analysis for why the link still applies given the specificity of the aff. For instance, if you run a politics DA, if you win living wages are unpopular, the plan will still trigger the link, since it’s an example of living wage.
2. No warrant: even if you don’t get access to your DAs <OR WHATEVER GROUND THEY CLAIM YOU TAKE AWAY>, you still get access to a host of other arguments, like generic CPs, Ks, NCs. Even core util case turns like unemployment and crime would still apply. You simply have to weigh.
3. Quality of ground outweighs because
4. If you have a ton of bad arguments you can make, they are still all bad. Quality of argumentation is what makes ground desirable
5. Quantity past a threshold is inaccessible because rounds are too short to read all the arguments you have access too

## AT Must Spec to City

#### Counterinterp: The aff solvency advocate must be a professor in a relevant field. Living wages apply to businesses holding contracts with the government

Mullin 12 – Professor in the Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning Department at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Associate Director of the Center for Economic Development, and former Dean of the Graduate School

(Mullin, John, Zenia Kotval, Zeenat Kotval-K, and Patricia Machemer. “A living wage standard: A case study of the US Virgin Islands.” *Local Economy* August/September 2012 27: 541-557, doi:10.1177/0269094212449581)

Pollin et al. (2008) identify another distinction between a minimum wage and a living wage in that a minimum wage affects the vast majority of the low-wage workforce, while living wages have a much narrower coverage. Typically, a living wage ordinance is a local law that establishes a wage floor for a specific group of workers. By far the most common ordinance only applies to businesses holding service contracts with government. To a lesser degree, the ordinance extends to employers that receive subsidies or tax abatements from government.

#### I meet --- I defend normal means. This means airports create contracts with the government, as per the Mullin ev. Also, my solvency advocate is an economics professor at UC Berkeley. I will give offensive reasons to prefer the counterinterp on the original shell. Go there now:

### Parallel Turns

1. Limits: their interp allows for infinite affs. There are tens of thousands of cities within the US alone, even more when considering other countries. Predictable limits is key to fairness and education since debaters can’t form in-depth strategies if they have to prep for thousands of affs.

#### Limits are a prereq to any impact. Large limits kill the activity

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. National debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske believes that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caught without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

1. Topic lit: most authors justify why living wages are good in governments. They look at effects of living wage on cities to make a more generalized claim about the government itself. Topic lit is key to fairness because it’s the basis for pre-round prep. Topic lit is key to education because it allows us to research within the topic, which is key since it changes every two months.

### AT Quality of Ground

1. No warrant: obviously you would think your quality of ground sucks since you are biased.
2. TURN: better quality of ground in the world of my counter-interp. Studies such as Doucouliagos and Stanley, Schmitt, Lester and Jacobs, Adam and Neumark, Neumark and Wascher are excellent and can be used for both sides. This is supercharged because he/she can’t even name a single study that would be excluded under my interp.
3. No briteline for what constitutes good quality of ground. I think the ground I give you is very good.

### AT Field Context

1. TURN: my counter-interp is better for field context <PICK AND CHOOSE THE FOLLOWING>:
   1. My author is qualified. Mullin is a professor in regional planning, which means he has to know the structure of a city and how policies would affect it, including living wage. Further, he is the associate director of the Center for Economic Development, making him qualified to talk about economic issues such as the living wage, while <DO COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS>
   2. My evidence is more recent, allowing it to take into account of changes to living wages over time and after the evidence on the interp
2. No warrant: my evidence in the AC indicates that my AC is within the field context.
3. No internal link: no reason your author should be the end-all-be-all for determining field context. This is especially true on this topic when there are conflicting definitions in the literature about living wage.

### AT Depth

1. <READ LIMITS HERE IF I HAVEN’T ALREADY> TURN: limits turn your depth argument. If there is a limitless number of affs debaters will never be able to prepare in-depth. Even if having a deep discussion is theoretically possible, it will never occur under your interp.
2. Non-unique: I also allow for a deep discussion. I only defend living wages in airports, which means links have to be specific to airports. This means we get a deep discussion since we are focused on airports instead of all industries.

## AT Must Spec to Government

#### Counter-interp: the affirmative must defend just governments as the actor and cannot specify specific governments to defend. Nebel:

http://vbriefly.com/2014/12/19/jake-nebel-on-specifying-just-governments/

I believe that debaters shouldn’t specify a government on the living wage topic. The standard argument for this is simple: “just governments” is a plural noun phrase, so it refers to more than one just government. Most debaters will stop there. But there is much more to say. (Some seem not to care about the plural construction. I plan to address this view in a later article about the parametric conception of topicality.) Some noun phrases include articles like “the,” demonstratives like “these,” possessives like “my,” or quantifiers like “some” or “all.” These words are called determiners. Bare plurals, including “just governments,” lack determiners. There’s no article, demonstrative, possessive, or quantifier in front of the noun to tell you how many or which governments are being discussed. We use bare plurals for two main purposes. Consider some examples: Debaters are here. Debaters are smart. In (1), “debaters” seems equivalent to “some debaters.” It is true just in case there is more than one debater around. If I enter a restaurant and utter (1), I speak truly if there are a couple of debaters at a table. This is an *existential* use of the bare plural, because it just says that there exist things of the relevant class (debaters) that meet the relevant description (being here). In (2), though, “debaters” seems to refer to debaters in general. This use of the bare plural is *generic*. Some say that generics refer to kinds of things, rather than particular members of their kinds, or that they refer to typical cases. There is a large literature on understanding generics. Here my aim is not to figure out the truth conditions for the generic reading of the resolution; I shall simply work with our pre-theoretical grip on the contrast between sentences like (1) and (2). This distinction bears importantly on the resolution. If “just governments” is a generic bare plural, then the debate is about whether just governments in general ought to require that employers pay a living wage. If it is an existential bare plural, then the debate is about whether some just governments—i.e., more than one—ought to require that employers pay a living wage. Only the second interpretation allows one to affirm by specifying a few governments. To my ear, the generic reading is correct. I think the best evidence for this is simply the undistorted judgments of ordinary speakers. No competent speaker of English would, without distorting influence or additional evidence of generalizability, endorse an inference from a plan involving two just governments to the resolution. Suppose Sally, an American citizen, believes that the U.S. and Canada should require employers to pay a living wage, but that no other government (just or unjust, actual or possible) should. She would not represent her view by asserting, “Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage.” She would deny this claim and hold that the U.S. and Canada are exceptions. One might object that Sally would endorse this assertion if she believed that the U.S. and Canada are the only just governments. Maybe she would, but that is explained by the generic reading, because she would then be making a generalization about (what she believes to be) just governments. And the onus would be on the affirmative, when specifying particular governments, to add such a premise. Moreover, many linguists would add that Sally could not regard it is as mere accident that these governments are just and that they ought to require employers to pay a living wage: the resolution requires there to be some explanatory connection between the justness of governments and the living wage requirement (see Carlson 2005). This is good evidence because ordinary speakers have an implicit (but not infallible) mastery over the language in which the resolution is stated. The resolution is stated in English, not in some special debate-specific dialect of English. Facts of usage constrain interpretation. The existential interpretation is not even, as I see it, eligible. So its pragmatic benefits are irrelevant. Compare: I think it would be better if the resolution were, “It is not the case that just governments ought to …” But that’s not the resolution, so it’s not even an eligible interpretation in a T debate. (Here I assume a controversial view about whether pragmatic benefits can justify a semantically inadequate interpretation of the resolution. I cannot defend this view here, but I welcome questions and objections in the comments to be addressed in a later article.)

#### I meet --- the actor I defend is just governments. I will give offensive reasons to prefer the counterinterp on the original shell. Go there now:

### Parallel Turns

1. Grammar—the Nebel evidence explains why defending just governments in general is the only grammatical of the topic. Grammar is key to an accurate reading of the resolution, since it’s the tool which speakers of English use to understand sentence structure. This means affs that defend specific governments are not-topical. 3 impacts:
2. T comes first because the most fair or educational way to debate is constrained by the context of the topic we are given.
3. T is the largest link into pre-round predictability, which is key to fairness because it ensures both debaters have an equal opportunity to debate the resolution at hand.
4. T is a prime facie voter on jurisdiction because you couldn’t vote for an AC that only talks about the Red Sox.
5. Limits: his/her interp allows the aff to defend any country, which allows for around 200 affs. Further, the aff can defend an combination of countries too, which allow for limitless affs. Predictable limits is key to fairness and education since debaters can’t form in-depth strategies if they have to prep for thousands of affs.

#### Limits are a prereq to any impact. Large limits kill the activity

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### AT Quality of Ground

1. <READ GRAMMAR HERE IF YOU HAVEN’T ALREADY> TURN: grammar turns your ground arguments because T explains what ground you deserve access too. Saying I kill specific disad ground is irrelevant because that ground wasn’t part of the resolution.
2. No warrant: obviously you would think your quality of ground sucks since you are biased.
3. No briteline for what constitutes good quality of ground. I think the ground I give you is very good.

### AT Depth

1. <READ LIMITS HERE IF I HAVEN’T ALREADY> TURN: limits turn your depth argument. If there is a limitless number of affs debaters will never be able to prepare in-depth. Even if having a deep discussion is theoretically possible, it will never occur under your interp.
2. Non-unique: I also allow for a deep discussion. I only defend living wages in airports, which means links have to be specific to airports. This means we get a deep discussion since we are focused on airports instead of all industries.

### AT Topic Lit

1. TURN: my interpretation is better for topic lit. <EXPLAIN WHY THEIR INTERP IS BAD FOR TOPIC LIT>
2. No warrant: there is plenty of topic lit on the effects of wage increases on a global scale, since many countries already implemented minimum wage.
3. TURN: I allow for the most topic lit because I allow country-specific empirics and comparison between countries.

1. Teaching Philosophy 36:3, September 2013 271 Teaching Philosophy through Lincoln-Douglas Debate JACOB NEBEL Wolfson College, Oxford University RYAN W. DAVIS Harvard University PETER VAN ELSWYK Rutgers University BEN HOLGUIN New York University [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Teaching Philosophy 36:3, September 2013 271 Teaching Philosophy through Lincoln-Douglas Debate JACOB NEBEL Wolfson College, Oxford University RYAN W. DAVIS Harvard University PETER VAN ELSWYK Rutgers University BEN HOLGUIN New York University [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The Economic Effects of Living Wage Laws: A Provisional Review¶ Scott Adams and David Neumark¶ NBER Working Paper No. 10562¶ June 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Enoch, David (Professor of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem). *Intending, Foreseeing, and the State*. Legal Theory, Vol. 13, No. 2. 2007. Pgs. 16-17.  [↑](#footnote-ref-4)